Unveiling the Divine: Duns Scotus vs Aquinas on God’s Attributes

Discussions about the nature of God have captivated the minds of scholars, theologians, and philosophers for centuries. One perspective is that of John Duns Scotus, a medieval thinker whose ideas on the attributes of God have set him apart from many of his contemporaries, including the renowned Thomas Aquinas. In this blog post, heavily inspired by Jake Brancatella’s dialogue on the subject, we will delve into Duns Scotus' intriguing beliefs about God's attributes, examining how they diverge from Aquinas' understanding.

Duns Scotus believed that God has real attributes that are not identical to each other nor to His essence yet they are inseparable from each other and the essence. They are not free floating entities apart from God. God cannot exist without them nor can they exist without God. At least in the Sunni Athari position, when it is said that God cannot exist without His attribute and His attributes cannot exist without Him, it is a counterfactual dependence not a causal dependence as God is not composed as if God is composed then He is contingent and therefore not God who is necessary. This dependence is merely by association. For example, it is an entailment of God’s existence which implies statements like the composite thing cannot exist without the existence of its parts, or two parts cannot exist without the other part, or the part cannot exist without the existence of the whole, or the attribute cannot exist without the subject of its attribution. Again, it is not a causal dependency as it is not that each of the two things, His essence and His attributes, is dependent on the other in such a way that the other is an efficient cause for it, or circular dependency, rather the existence of the two things is a condition for the other thing, they must go together logically speaking. It would seem that Duns Scotus’ view on God and His attributes are closer to the Islamic tradition than to Thomas Aquinas’. For a greater breakdown of Athari Metaphysics refer to my blog posts, “Overview of Athari Metaphysics” and “Islam and Divine Simplicity”.

There is a distinction within God that does not lead to composition as His attributes are able to be distinguished and actualized within God infinitely and cannot be separated from His essence. These attributes can be expressed in a finite mode in creation according to Duns Scotus. There is an objective difference between God’s perfect and infinite love, power, mercy, and wrath prior to the mind’s activity. There is a formal distinction between His attributes not a virtual distinction. A Catholic is not necessarily bound to the Thomistic tradition especially considering it leads to modal collapse as explained in the refutation of Thomistic divine simplicity in my blog posts previously mentioned.

Aquinas’ view of divine simplicity has the underlying metaphysical assumption that anything that has complexity has parts and whatever has parts is contingent as those parts can be separated or put together. It would seem that Duns Scotus and the Athari view would deny the assumption that parthood necessitates contingency and corruptibility. Despite the fact that God’s attributes are distinct does not mean they can be separated from His essence unless it can be proven otherwise.

According to scholar Richard Alan Cross, 

“On Scotus’ account, infinity when applied to God is just a sort of property and this is quite distinct from Aquinas’ view that infinity is just a negation. Clearly allowing that a property like infinity is some sense distinct from the attribute it modifies will entail that God has formally distinct properties at the least the intrinsic mode of any divine attribute or the divine essence will be formally distinct from both attribute and divine essence… all of God’s attributes are essential to Him, He is inseparable from any of them, and they are inseparable from each other, but His attributes are nevertheless different attributes. They satisfy Scotus’ idea for what is called a formal distinction… The fact that the attributes are different than each other is entailed though, perhaps not explained by Scotus’ univocity theory. According to this theory, the basic lexical definitions of some of the terms applied to God are exactly the same as the lexical definitions of those terms when applied to creatures. Now the lexical definitions of many such terms when applied to creatures are different from each other and Scotus’ criterion for a formal distinction between different attributes is roughly that the attributes admit of different lexical definitions. Different divine attributes will be formally distinct from each other. Scotus makes the point by arguing that if these different attributes were not distinct in God then given his univocity theory, they will not be distinct in creatures either. So univocity as understood by Scotus entails a weak account of divine simplicity according to which the divine attributes are distinct from each other. On Scotus’ account, divine simplicity is consistent with God having several formally distinct transcendental attributes… a formal distinction does not entail having parts.” (Duns Scotus, Great Medieval Thinkers pp 42-43)

The Athari position would disagree with Dun Scotus’ univocity theory as it favors an analogical theory of predication similar to Aquinas. When it said to be analogically predicated of the subject, God in this case, an individual can be healthy, and a salad can be healthy, health is used in similar but not exact terms for if it was exact that would be univocal prediction or anthropomorphizing God which is disbelief in Islam. There is nothing in creation like unto God who is infinite and thus asking the “howness” of God’s attribute is futile. Cross continues,

“... if  we are to attribute a property to something then that property must be really distinct from the thing, there must be a form instantiated by the thing. Here, the divine essence refers to the concrete divine existence, something which we might want to label God’s substance… an instantiated property does not have to be really distinct from its subject. A thing’s necessary or essential properties for example are properties that it cannot exist without but on Scotus’ separability condition for real distinction, properties that something cannot be without cannot really be distinct from it. Scotus seems here to imply that God is the subject of His essential attributes i.e. the divine attributes in much the same way as any substance on his account is the subject of its essential properties. On this showing there will be a formal distinction between God and His attributes. God and His attributes are inseparable but the definition of no divine attribute will fully encompass the divine substance. Equally, Scotus holds that God’s substance or essence is somehow explanatory of His attributes.” (pp 43)

Cross then compares this view to Aquinas’,

“Aquinas would agree I think with the claim that univocity entails a weak account of simplicity, he expressly claims that God’s simplicity prevents words we apply to God having the same sense that they have when we apply them to creatures. Aquinas accepts a strong account of divine simplicity according to which there are no distinctions at all between the divine attributes. For example, Aquinas holds that God’s wisdom is in every respect identical with his goodness. In fact, Aquinas holds that these attributes are in every respect identical to the divine essence and that this essence is in turn identical to God’s existence. On this account all divine attributes are just identical with existence” (pp 43)

Therefore, this is the reason why Aquinas holds to a theory of analogical predication rather than univocal predication. Thus, Cross accurately claims, “Scotus’ God is far less simple than Aquinas’ God”.