The Euthyphro Dilemma — With an Abrahamic Metaphysic of God


The Euthyphro Dilemma 


    If God commanded murder tomorrow, would the believer do it? If goodness is synthetic rather than analytical, the question is in virtue of what is the causal explanation for why God is good? If one appeals to God’s nature, goodness is either a standard that is external to God or it is arbitrary. If it is the former and God adheres to the standard of goodness but the theist provides and internal explanation for the standard coming from within God, is this enough to escape the dilemma? Is it possible for there to be a state of affairs in virtue of the good being external to God? Rather, it is within God’s nature to always be in accordance with that standard. There is an inherent primitive goodness in God as in His nature and that is the causal explanation for God’s moral commandment as good. Therefore, God’s nature is what sets the standard of goodness and God’s nature is the causal explanation. Why does goodness have to be an external property rather than an internal property of God - it does not. Goodness is a set property in God but God did not choose God’s properties, rather it is a logical necessity for the necessary being to have all metaphysically possible attributes for if the necessary being did not have all necessary attributes it would be contingent as there is a possible world where the necessary being did have said attributes. Could it be the case that because God has this property of goodness, it must be an instantiated property that is based on an abstract notion of goodness external to God? There is no circumstance where God has to be in accordance with something external to Himself such as a moral property called goodness, rather it is an intrinsic property due to His nature. God’s properties are not an instantiation of a Platonic form of goodness. This view does not necessarily fall into one of the two horns of the dilemma.

    Furthermore, it is the case that basic moral truths can be known without revelation through the rational faculty of human logic. Reason through the "fitra" knows that God must be the sole object of worship and reason also knows what actions are good and bad. This is because good and bad can be reduced to the difference between suitability, pleasure, profit, and benefit for the agent on one hand and the opposite on the other. When reason and revelation are both given full epistemic certainty, they can never contradict. 

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