Ibn Taymiyyah's Critique of Polytheism

In the seminal work Dalail Tawhid al-Rububiyah, Ibn Taymiyyah embarks on a rigorous intellectual journey, dissecting and critiquing the very foundations of polytheism. Ibn Taymiyyah’s argument against polytheism, or the idea of multiple all-powerful Gods is as follows: If there exists two equal creators of the world, they must be equally powerful or have power to create. Furthermore, they must be either powerful on their own or powerful only with the other. Ibn Taymiyyah explains that the latter option is an impossibility because if neither has power when existing on their own then either something occurs when they exist together that does not occur when each is on their own or nothing occurs. The first possibility is impossible as, 

“If some power that does not exist when each marker is on his own occurs when both are existing together, this power will either occur from the two makers themselves or occur from another. But both are impossible” (pg 61). 

This entails circular causal dependency as if neither has power for themselves to be powerful then they together cannot give each other power. For example, if A gives energy to B and B to A, this process can only begin if A has power but if A depends on B for power and B depends on A for power then none will have power as each requires the other for it unless there is an external agent providing them power. In this case, the external agent would be the true God. If, on the other hand, each of the two have power and each of their powers add up to be greater than themselves individually then they are creatures and not God as being all-powerful is a necessary attribute of God.

If both are equally powerful on their own then there are still problems with this. Ibn Taymiyyah explains that if they exist together then their powers either stay the same as before they were together or their powers change. In the first option is an impossibility as, 

“...when they are assumed to exist together, it will be inherently impossible for both to have the ability to cause motion and stillness. This is true whether they are assumed to agree or disagree” (pg 74).

If they agree then one cannot exert its power, such as moving an object, unless the other refrains as a single effect may not be entirely caused by both of the two. For example, if person A built a house entirely, it would be impossible to state that person B built the same house entirely. However, this entails that the power of the one refraining is limited. For God, being all-powerful is a necessary attribute as God could be more or less powerful He would be contingent. Therefore, any attributes that are necessary for that being also cannot cease to exist as long as the being itself exists. Therefore, the one refraining from acting is not God. Furthermore, how will it be decided who will agree to refrain from exerting its power? If both refrain their agency will not be possible and nothing will be created. This is impossible as creation exists. If they both decide to act this is also an impossibility as mentioned previously.

If they decided to disagree instead of agreeing then this is also problematic as two equally powerful beings will the opposite of each other. This will entail that neither of their wills will come to pass as they cancel out. Therefore, each will be powerless in disagreement and in agreement as expressed previously. To avoid being powerless in their disagreement, they need to act independently of each other. The creator whose will is actually realized or executed is the one with power, and therefore is considered God. The other creator, whose will cannot be carried out, is considered powerless and not God by extension.

Ibn Taymiyyah demonstrates that the coexistence of two equal creators would either lead to circular causal dependency, rendering them both powerless, or result in a contradictory scenario where their powers negate each other. In either case, the notion of multiple all-powerful Gods collapses under scrutiny.