Ibn Taymiyya’s Critique of the Syllogism

 

 

         Before we discuss Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of syllogisms, the background knowledge of Ibn Sina and Aristotelian epistemology needs to be established. Like the Thomists, Ibn Sina was a foundationalist. Foundationalism builds new knowledge on a base of primary knowledge. Without this base, reasoning would lead to an infinite regress (constantly needing to justify each step with another, prior step). Furthermore, Ibn Sina divided knowledge into conceptualization and assent with the former being concepts of the mind such as primary and acquired concepts. Primary concepts are known immediately without the need for reasoning. Examples include fundamental notions like “thing” and “existent”. Acquired concepts, on the other hand, are obtained by forming real definitions. These definitions specify the essence of a species by indicating its genus and specific difference. For example, the concept of “human” is defined as “rational animal” derived by understanding “animal” as the genus and “rational” as the specific difference. Assent is what affirms the validity of any proposition which can be divided into primary and acquired assent. Primary assent can either be certain or probable with the former being self-evident truths such as the whole being greater than the part, direct sense perception such as with the senses, and widely transmitted reports. Probable primary assent refers to customs and laws. Acquired assents, on the other hand, are like induction or analogy which are both probable and syllogisms which are certain.

         For background of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology, it is discussed in my blog post titled, “Ibn Taymiyya’s Epistemology: The Fitra”. As for his critique of Ibn Sina, he rejected the idea that definitions can tell you the true essence of a thing and also rejects that the attributes of extramental realities are not divided into those which are quiddative or essential and those which are not. Rather, he claimed that definitions are based on linguistics rather than revealing real essences. Furthermore, real definitions cannot lead to the acquisition of conceptualizations at all. Rather, conceptualizations are empirical as they arise a posteriori. As for definitions such as “rational animal” for humans, real definitions do not impart new knowledge. For someone to understand a definition, they must already be familiar with the terms used in the definition. The definition of "human" as a "rational animal" is merely an assertion. A person who understands this definition does so based on prior knowledge, not because the definition itself provided new information. For someone unfamiliar with the concept hearing the definition alone is insufficient; they need further validation to accept it.

         As for the syllogism, he deemed it to be unnecessary. As for syllogisms themselves, he argued that they do not need to be composed of a minimum of two premises. He argued that, depending on the person seeking knowledge, sometimes only one premise is needed to make an inference of its necessary entailment. For example,

“Ibn Taymiyya notes that every created thing known with certainty to exist entails the existence of the Creator necessarily. The argument does not need to be reformulated into a categorical syllogism to provide certainty, and to require the syllogistic form is mere pedantry.” (Hoover, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Furthermore, as a nominalist, he claimed that all of the physical world’s knowledge is rooted in particulars. Therefore, as an empiricist (not in all cases he can be described as such as he believed that the existence of God can be argued rationally), he claimed that syllogisms using universal principles to describe the particulars of the world can never be certain but only probabilistic. For example, to determine whether the universal, “All flames burn”, is true one would need to examine all flames to see whether they all burn. If someone did examine every flame then there would be no point in constructing a syllogism. Revelation can impart true knowledge universally of particulars.

         Another argument he makes against syllogisms is that analogy and syllogism are the same thing or lead to the same knowledge. While Aristotelian logic claimed that that analogy can never be certain as it only compares two particulars based on a shared characteristic and the cause of the shared characteristic cannot be known with certainty, Ibn Taymiyya claimed that the middle term in a syllogism is identical to an analogy and is identical to the first figure in a syllogism after being reformulated. For example,

“He illustrates with the famous juristic case of date wine (nabīdh). Date wine is forbidden by analogy to grape wine because both intoxicate. Intoxication is the cause of forbiddance in both the original and the assimilated cases. Likewise, date wine is forbidden by the following demonstration: every date wine is an intoxicant; every intoxicant is forbidden; therefore, date wine is forbidden. Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges that the greatest question concerning analogy is how to ascertain that the characteristic shared by the original and assimilated cases (e.g., intoxication) causes or necessitates the ruling (e.g., forbiddance). However, he explains, that is no different from the equally difficult problem of identifying the middle term in a categorical syllogism. If the middle term is certainly the cause and the premises are certain, that forms a demonstration. Otherwise, the major premise in the syllogism will be only probable, and the conclusion will likewise be only probable. As noted above, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that it is not possible to acquire certain knowledge of universal propositions in extramental reality (e.g., that all flames burn), and so he effectively reduces the categorical syllogism to the epistemic level of analogy as a tool for acquiring new knowledge of the world outside the mind.” (Hoover, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In other words, date wine is forbidden by analogy to grape wine because both intoxicate and thus intoxication is the cause for it being haram. This analogy can be formulated into a syllogism

         P1: Every date wine is an intoxicant.

         P2: Every intoxicant is forbidden.

         C1: Therefore, every date wine is forbidden.

He acknowledges the difficulty in analogies in identifying that the shared characteristic being the cause or the middle term in the syllogism but argues that syllogisms have the same problem. If the syllogism’s middle term is probable then the conclusion is probable. The middle term being a universal is difficult as discussed earlier with the flame example. Universals are understood through examining particular cases. Furthermore, if the necessitating cause in the analogy is universal then the original case used in the analogy is no longer needed for future rulings as the ruling will apply universally wherever the cause, intoxication in the case of wine, is present. Revelation plays a big role in establishing universal principles. Therefore, divine revelation can provide certain knowledge about the particulars which empirical observation alone cannot achieve.