Hidden Nestorianism: Unveiling the Orthodox Dilemma of The Two Sons Worry

 

 

The Oxford English Dictionary defines Nestorianism as “The doctrine of Nestorius, patriarch of Constantinople (appointed in 428), by which Christ is asserted to have had distinct human and divine persons.” Nestorian Christology promotes the concept of a prosopic union of two persons that are divine and human in Jesus Christ, thus trying to avoid and replace the concept of a hypostatic union. This Christological position is defined as radical Dyophysitism, and differs from orthodox Dyophysitism, or that Christ was one divine person with two natures, which was reaffirmed at the Council of Chalcedon in 451. Such teachings brought Nestorius into conflict with other prominent church leaders, most notably Cyril of Alexandria, who issued 12 anathemas against him. Nestorius’ teachings were deemed heretical at the Council of Ephesus in 431, and again at the Council of Chalcedon.

The early church fathers believed that the self could be defined as a rational mind/soul and therefore a human person is a rational mind/soul employing a human body. They also believed the Son to be one person. In becoming incarnate as Jesus Christ, God the Son assumes a rational soul and a human body. This is known as a 3-part christology as there is the Word, a rational human soul, and a human body. However, this may lead to some unwanted contradictions through the following premises:

 

P1) A rational soul and a human body are sufficient for human personhood.

P2) If the Son assumes a rational soul and a human body, then the Son assumed a human person.

P3) The Son assumed a rational soul and a human body.

C1) Therefore, the Son assumed a human person.

P4) If the Son assumed a human person then there are two people in Jesus Christ.

C2) Therefore, there are two people in Jesus Christ.

P5) If there are two people in Jesus Christ, then orthodoxy is false.

C3) Therefore, orthodoxy is false.

 

It seems that orthodoxy wants on one hand to affirm that Christ was both human and God but on the other hand hold to him being one person. If one was to attempt to refute this then they would have to reject the second premise of the argument, “If the Son assumes a rational soul and a human body, then the Son assumes a human person.”. One of the ways to deny the second premise is to simply claim it is a mystery only whose explanation is only known to God alone. In other words, there is a difference but that difference cannot be known through logic or was not revealed through revelation. It would seem that the orthodox view of the hypostatic union is Nestorianism but it is not.

         12th century Italian scholastic theologian, Peter Lombard, attempted to provide a second explanation to solve this issue. In his book, The Sentences, he stated,

 

“this does not follow, because the soul is not a person when it is united personally to another thing, but when it exists by itself… But that particular soul never existed without being joined to another thing; and so it was not the case that the taking of that soul was the taking of another person.” (The Sentences, Book 3, Distinction V.3.2.)

 

In other words, if a soul existed by itself then it is a person but the moment it began to exist it was united to the Son and therefore it is not a person. However, according to Dr. Ryan Mullins, on the problem of the heresy of adoptionism, the 4th century bishop and theologian, Theodore of Mopsuestia, gave a similar solution but was later condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople in 553. Furthermore, no one explains why this relationship removes personhood from the soul. If a soul can have a unique first-person perspective, and unique actions without a body it does make sense for this to go away when assuming a body. Furthermore, as Dr. Mullins points out in his paper which inspired this blog post, “Classical Theism, Christology, and the Two Sons Worry”,

           

“The second problem is that the Assumption Relation violates the neo-Chalcedonian Christology of the Fifth Ecumenical Council. On the Assumption Relation, the Son blocks the assumed soul from having its own personhood. If the Son had not assumed the human nature of Jesus, this human nature would have constituted a full human person. Flint is explicit about this entailment from the Assumption Relation.  However, on the neo-Chalcedonian Christology of Constantinople II, this is declared as a heresy because the human nature could not have personhood apart from the incarnation on pain of the Two Sons Worry. Neo-Chalcedonian Christology denies that the Son knocks the personhood out of the assumed soul. Instead, neo-Chalcedonian Christology affirms that the Son brings His personhood to a soul that somehow could not be a person on its own. So the Assumption Relation will not help us find the hypostatic union.”

 

Another objection is that one can predicate things to the one of the natures of Jesus Christ and through the Communicatio Idiomatum it can be predicated to the other nature and therefore onto the one person of the Son. Therefore, one can say that God died on the cross or God was born of a virgin. However, this apparently cannot be said in Nestorianism as there are not two natures in a hypostatic union but two persons in Christ. However, this does not show a metaphysical difference between orthodoxy and Nestorianism but is rather semantical. Therefore, someone who holds to the orthodox position must show that there is a metaphysical difference that allows for these semantical differences to be made besides claiming mystery.

In conclusion, the examination of the objection of Nestorianism brings to light a theological quandary regarding Christ's dual nature and singular personhood. It seems to me the only way to avoid it is to bite the bullet and appeal to mystery as so far there has not been a sufficient model to escape the two Sons worry.