Ibn Taymiyya on Universals and Particulars

 

*Before reading, refer to my previous post on universals and particulars for background information*

           

         For Ibn Taymiyya there was a distinction between external existence and mental existence. Furthermore, according to him, it is a matter of necessary knowledge that all existents fall into either one of two categories: existing in the external world or only in the mind. He believed that universals or abstract concepts only existed in the mind while particulars existed in the external world. This is contrary to the philosophers who claimed that universals existed outside the mind either existing ontologically independent of the particular as with Plato and his perfect forms or inside the particular as with Aristotle. It is the sharing of the universals that particulars can be part of the same species. Yet, despite the sharing of the universal, each particular is distinct from the other. Therefore, there are elements in which they share the universal while having elements that cause them to differ which are distinct from their universal essence and are unique to each particular. For example, there can be a white horse and a black horse. They share the universal of “horse-ness”  including essential attributes like having four legs, a mane, and a tail. They share the universal of having color even though they are distinct horses. They also share the universal of existence. This sharing of universals is an ontological aspect rather than a logical one.

         In Islamic philosophy, to avoid anthropomorphism, there was a denial any positive attributes of God as any ontological sharing of attributes would suggest similarities between the particulars that are sharing the universals. Ibn Taymiyya rejects this reasoning as he claims that universals exist only in the mind logically rather than ontologically.

However, despite his strong anti-realist stance on universals, there are areas where he appears to lean towards a “moderate realism”. Ibn Taymiyya argues that these natural universals can only exist in the external world as individual instances. For example, the universal notion of “horse-ness” is derived by observing specific horses. From this our mind abstracts a universal concept from the particulars which is purely a mental concept and does not have independent existence or reality in the external world.

Ibn Taymiyya therefore concluded that nothing in the external world exists except specific entities with their inherent qualities. Each member of a species possesses a unique and separate existence that is not shared ontologically with anything else. For example, two human beings do not share the same specific humanity but they do coincide in an absolute humanity. However, this absolute cannot exist independently in any particular form. According to Ibn Taymiyya, particular things are not constituted by anything absolute; they are defined only by their specific qualities, which are unique to them and not shared by any other. The only form of “sharing” that occurs is the common classification of these entities under universal concepts within the mind. However, these universal concepts are purely mental and possess only logical existence within the mind and serve as classifications in human cognition. In other words, while there might be similarity among externally existing particulars, it is only a mental judgment after abstracting their qualities for classification.