The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya: A Comprehensive Overview of His Life and Systematic Theology

Life:

Ibn Taymiyya (January 22, 1263 - September 26, 1328 (age 65 years)) was born in in Harran, Mamluk Sultanate (modern day Turkey) to a family of traditional Hanbali scholars. In 1269, Ibn Taymiyya, aged seven, left Harran together with his father and three brothers; however, the city was completely destroyed by the ensuing Mongol invasion. Ibn Taymiyya's family moved and settled in Damascus, Syria, which was ruled by the Mamluk Sultanate at the time. In Damascus, his father served as the director of the Sukkariyya Madrasa, a place where Ibn Taymiyya also received his early education. He acquainted himself with the religious and secular sciences of his time. His religious studies began in his early teens when he committed the entire Quran to memory, and later came to learn the disciplines of the Quran. From his father, he learnt the religious science of jurisprudence and its principles.[43] Ibn Taymiyya studied the works of Ahmad ibn Hanbal, Abu Bakr al-Khallal, and Ibn Qudama, as well as the works of his own grandfather, Majd al-Din. His study of jurisprudence was not limited to the Hanbali tradition, as he also studied the other schools of jurisprudence. The number of scholars under which he studied hadith is said to number more than two-hundred, four of whom were women. At the age of 17 he was given permission by the top scholars of the land allowing him to pass legal verdicts thus making him a judge. He also studied the Arabic language in depth as well as mathematics, algebra, calligraphy, speculative theology, philosophy, history, heresiography, Sufism, and finished his education at 20 years old. After the death of his father in 1284, he became the head of the school his father taught at and eventually became a chair of a bigger university. At 29 years old in 1292 he wrote his first book on the rites of pilgrimage to Mecca. He remained faithful throughout his life to this school, whose doctrines he had mastered, but he nevertheless called for ijtihad (independent reasoning by one who is qualified) and discouraged taqlid or blind following. Ibn Taymiyya had a simple life, most of which he dedicated to learning, writing, and teaching. He never married nor did he have a female companion throughout his years. His work was most influenced by the sayings and actions of the first three generations of Muslims (salaf), which is displayed in his works where he would give preference to their opinions over those of his contemporaries. Due to him writing based on his own judicial judgement, whenever he went again a popular ruling he gained a lot of negative attention but he did not mind. Ibn Taymiyya was a religious scholar as well as an Islamic political activist. In his efforts he was persecuted and imprisoned on six occasions with the total time spent inside prison coming to over six years. Other sources say that he spent over twelve years in prison. His detentions were due to the pushback from the clerical establishment of the Mamluk Sultanate, who opposed certain elements of his creed and his views on some jurisprudential issues and not complying with the doctrines and practices prevalent among powerful religious and Sufi establishments such as the worship of saints and praying at graves. His first imprisonment was due to him issuing a ruling that a Christian man was to be put to death for insulting the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ and Islam. Despite the fact that he had the popular support, the governor of Syria spared his life and Ibn Taymiyya publicly protested this which led to his arrest where he wrote a treatise on the subject while in prison. Ibn Taymiyya, in other acts of activism, he led an anti-debauchery campaign in brothels and taverns, hitting an atheist before his public execution, destroying what was thought to be a sacred rock in a mosque, attacking astrologers and obliging deviant Sufi Shaykhs to make public acts of contrition and adhere to the Sunnah. Ibn Taymiyya and his disciples used to condemn wine sellers and they would attack wine shops in Damascus by breaking wine bottles and pouring them onto the floor. Eventually, in 1296 he became a professor at the oldest institution in Damascus. However, when he took up the job, the Mamluk sultan at the time was about to commission an expedition against the Mongols and Christians who sacked Baghdad and Harran, the birthplace of Ibn Taymiyya, for that purpose, he urged Ibn Taymiyya to call the Muslims to war. In 1298 he wrote, “Al-`Aqidat al-Hamawiyat al-Kubra (The creed of the great people of Hama)”. The book is about divine attributes and it served as an answer to a question from the city of Hama, Syria. This book upset a lot of Ashari scholars as they had a different theological view on God’s attributes. Ibn Taymiyya called for a more literal view of God’s attributes described in the Quran while the Asharites viewed them metaphorically. In 1300 and 1305 he took part in an expedition against some Shia in Lebanon who were collaborating with the Mongols and Christians.

The first Mongol invasion of Syria (December 1299 - April 1300) was part of a Mamluk campaign against the Mongol-allied Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia. Ibn Taymiyya declared the Mongol Ilkhanid regime and its laws as un-Islamic, denouncing their ruler Ghazan Khan as an infidel. He urged resistance against the Mongols and compared the situation to early Islamic battles against apostates. Despite widespread panic and flight, Ibn Taymiyya remained in Damascus in 1303 while the Mongols occupied it, rallying the people and negotiating directly with Mongol leaders for the release of prisoners and succeeded. In the second invasion (October 1300 - January 1301), Ibn Taymiyya continued to call for jihad against the Mongols, encouraging both civilians and military leaders to fight. His commitment was so strong that he declared Muslims should kill him if he were ever seen supporting the Mongols. During the third invasion in 1303, Ibn Taymiyya issued a significant fatwa declaring jihad against the Mongols obligatory, arguing they were not true Muslims due to their adherence to man-made laws over Sharia. He categorized those collaborating with the Mongols as apostates, legitimizing violence against them. Ibn Taymiyya personally led forces in the Battle of Marj al-Saffar, where the Mongols were decisively defeated, ending their control of Syria. His leadership and fatwas significantly boosted his reputation and influence among the masses.

Ibn Taymiyya was a fervent polemicist who zealously launched theological refutations against various religious sects such as the Sufis, Jahmites, Ash'arites, Shias, Falsafa (philosophers), etc. He was imprisoned several times for conflicting with the prevailing opinions of the jurists and theologians of his day. A judge from the city of Wasit, Iraq, requested that Ibn Taymiyya write a book on creed. His subsequent creedal work, Al-Aqidah Al-Waasitiyyah, caused him trouble with the authorities. Ibn Taymiyya adopted the view that God should be described as he was literally described in the Qur'an and in the hadith, and that all Muslims were required to believe this because according to him it was the view held by the early Muslim community (salaf). Within the space of two years (1305–1306) four separate religious council hearings were held to assess the correctness of his creed. At the first meeting, the Asharis accused him of anthropomorphism, he was 42 at this time. Others argued that his view was only the Hanbali view than that other schools of thought could have a different metaphysical understanding of God. Uncompromising, Ibn Taymiyya maintained that it was obligatory for all scholars to adhere to his creed. Two separate councils were held a year later on January 22 and 28, 1306 where he was found innocent. Despite this, in April 1306 the chief Islamic judges of the Mamluk state declared Ibn Taymiyya guilty and he was incarcerated. He was released four months later in September. After his release, he was tried again and was found not guilty. He moved to Cairo to attempt to resolve the issue with the sultan. In Cairo he was found not guilty but was summoned again in court on April 8th, 1306 and was found guilty on the charges of anthropomorphism. Thereafter, he together with his two brothers were imprisoned in Cairo until September 25, 1307. He was freed due to the help he received from two amirs; Salar and Muhanna ibn Isa, but he was not allowed to go back to Syria. Living in Cairo, there were protests against him by Sufi scholars Their main contention was Ibn Taymiyya’s stance on tawassul (intercession). In his view, a person could not ask anyone other than God for help except on the Day of Judgement when intercession in his view would be possible. At the time, the people did not restrict intercession to just the Day of Judgement but rather they said it was allowed in other cases. Due to this, Ibn Taymiyya, now aged 45, was ordered to appear before the Shafi’i judge Badr al-Din in March 1308 and was questioned on his stance regarding intercession. Thereafter, he was incarcerated in the prison of the judges in Cairo for some months. After his release, he was allowed to return to Syria, should he so wish. Ibn Taymiyya however stayed in Egypt for a further five years. 1309, the year after his release, saw a new Mamluk sultan accede to the throne, Baibars al-Jashnakir. His reign, marked by economical and political unrest, only lasted a year. In August 1309, Ibn Taymiyya was taken into custody and placed under house arrest for seven months in the new sultan’s palace in Alexandria. He was freed when al-Nasir Muhammad retook the position of sultan on March 4, 1310.

He spent his last fifteen years in Damascus. Aged 50, Ibn Taymiyya returned to Damascus via Jerusalem on February 28, 1313. Damascus was now under the governorship of Tankiz. There, Ibn Taymiyya continued his teaching role as professor of Hanbali fiqh. This is when he taught his most famous student, Ibn Qayyim Al-Jawziyya, who went on to become a noted scholar in Islamic history. Ibn Qayyim was to share in Ibn Taymiyya’s renewed persecution. There he wrote refutations against the Shias. He also wrote on divorce and its legal intricacies. Ibn Taymiyya’s fatwa on divorce was not accepted by the majority of scholars of the time and this continued into the Ottoman era. However, almost every modern Muslim nation-state has come to adopt Ibn Taymiyya's position on this issue of divorce. He was banned from issuing fatwas on the issue but he did not stop and was imprisoned again August 26, 1320, in the Citadel of Damascus. He was released about five months and 18 days later, on February 9, 1321, by order of the Sultan Al-Nasir. Ibn Taymiyya was reinstated as teacher of Hanbali law and he resumed teaching. In 1310 he wrote a treatise against the cult of worshipping saints and declared that traveling with the sole purpose of visiting the Prophet Muhammad’s ﷺ grave was a blameworthy religious innovation. For this, Ibn Taymiyya, was imprisoned in the Citadel of Damascus sixteen years later on July 18, 1326, aged 63, along with his student Ibn Qayyim. The sultan also prohibited him from issuing any further fatwas.

Ibn Taymiyya referred to his imprisonment as “a divine blessing”. During his incarceration, he wrote that, “when a scholar forsakes what he knows of the Book of God and of the sunnah of His messenger and follows the ruling of a ruler which contravenes a ruling of God and his messenger, he is a renegade, an unbeliever who deserves to be punished in this world and in the hereafter.” It was in prison where he wrote most of his writings.

He fell ill in early September 1328 and died at the age of 65, on September 26 of that year, whilst in prison at the Citadel of Damascus. It is reported that two hundred thousand men and fifteen to sixteen thousand women attended his funeral prayer.

Epistemology:

Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology is based on sense perception, reason, and report/revelation i.e. the Quran and Sunnah, with sense perception being the most straightforward as it provides and immediate sense of particulars while reason works with abstraction and inference. Therefore, he may be classified as a soft empiricist. However, the centerpiece of Ibn Taymiyya’s epistemology is the concept of the fitra. The fitra can be described as the natural disposition given to mankind created by God to recognize Him along with other a priori truths. Without the fitra, neither speculative reasoning would be possible, nor demonstration, discourse or language. Ibn Taymiyya allows that certain beliefs be sufficient for knowledge independent of inference with the fitra as the God given apparatus to do so.

For Ibn Taymiyya, the best argument for the existence of God is not through syllogisms but through the signs recognized by the fitra. The syllogistic arguments for God prove a necessary being but the proofs through the fitra prove His particular nature. The signs of God in the natural world results in an immediate grasping of the consequent belief in God if the fitra is intact just as sunlight is a sign that the sun exists. These signs can be within one’s self or cosmological or phenomenological signs. Therefore, God can be known through sense perception – both internally and externally. Through the natural disposition of humanity created by God to form beliefs about Him, our sense perceptual faculties are disposed to make non-inference-based beliefs about God from perceiving His signs in the world.

“The created beings that indicate the creator are concomitant with its Creator, therefore it is not possible that they exist without the existence of their Creator, just as He cannot exist without His knowledge, power, will, wisdom, and mercy.” (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmoo al Fatawa)

Natural reason can lead to the existence of God as well. Just as the fitra allows for knowledge of the half being less than the whole without experience i.e. a priori, the existence of contingency necessitates a necessary being.

“It is known by the fiṭra which God created His servants upon and by the purity of reason (ṣarīḥ al-’aql), that what is temporally originated cannot come into being without an originator” (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmoo al Fatawa, 3:202)

However, this knowledge can be acquired through intuition a posteriori as well. Knowledge of God is something that is already known as it is necessary knowledge and these arguments show how it arises but individuals may act against their fitra as well. According to a leading scholar of Ibn Taymiyya, Dr. Jon Hoover, “[f]or Ibn Taymiyya, the fitra is the religion of Islam, but in potentiality rather than in actuality” (Encyclopaedia of Islam Three, pp 104-106). Therefore, the fitra is the potentiality to recognize God, where God both provides the signs and creates a natural ability to read the signs as coming from Him. According to scholar of Ibn Taymiyya, Jamie B. Turner, this definition of the fitra protects his epistemology from circular reasoning,

“In this case – where the prior knowledge is taken to be a kind of knowledge of God one has in potentia, in one’s ability to recognize God when God prompts one to know Him – there is no circularity.” (Turner JB, 2021, pp 7)

Rational argumentation for the existence of God may be used to convince those whose fitra may have been corrupted and thus require inference.

“The establishment and recognition of the Creator is innate [and] necessary in the souls of all people (fiṭrī ḍarūrī fī nufūs al-nās), even though some people have done something to corrupt their nature (fiṭra) such that they need an inference (naẓar) to achieve knowledge [of God]. This is the opinion of the majority of people, as well as the skilled debaters (ḥadhāq al-nuẓẓār); that knowledge of God is sometimes achieved by necessity [i.e. in ‘basic’ fashion] and other times by inference. (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmoo al Fatawa, 16:328)

For Ibn Taymiyya, the Qur’an makes reference to the natural signs in creation and thus acts as the external prompting for the fitra to respond and reflection over the Qur’an’s evidences may be achieved and thus perfects the fitra so we may worship and love God alone. The Qur’an is not only for the layman but for the philosopher as well.

“The distinction between the Qur’anic and the kalām theological methods is indeed that God commands worship of Him … He did not limit it to mere affirmation, as is the objective of the methods of kalām … the Qur’an [in contrast] relates knowledge of Him and service to Him. So, it combines the human faculties of knowledge and practice … [kalām methods] secures merely the affirmation and acknowledgment of God’s existence. (Ibn Taymiyya, Majmoo al Fatawa, 2:12)

Furthermore, his epistemology is externalist,

“The significance of these moves that Ibn Taymiyya makes in emphasizing the epistemic centrality of fiṭra and in broadening foundational knowledge, is in terms of the externalist epistemology that it implies: faculty-based approach to knowledge acquisition. In all such cases outlined above, these foundational beliefs obtain their status not (necessarily) in virtue of some reasons accessible to a subject, but because they are a consequence of one’s faculties operating properly, grounded in fiṭra. For on his scheme, “the proper functioning of all our epistemic faculties […] is predicated in all cases on the health and proper functioning of the fiṭra” (El-Tobgui 2020, 271), and it is in virtue of fiṭra that a human’s “knowledge of truth […] and the recognition of falsehood” is grounded (Ibn Taymiyya 2014, 49). For according to Ibn Taymiyya “children are born with sound fiṭra, which if left sound and intact, will make them choose knowledge (ma’rifa) over its denial” (Ibn Taymiyya 1979, 8:385). Thus, a central common-sense philosophical intuition is maintained here because the sorts of “common-sense” beliefs we hold (e.g., about the past, other minds, or the external world) are thought to be grounded in our natural cognitive dispositions as human beings, not in virtue of some collection of proofs.” (Turner JB, 2023, pp 6-7)

Ibn Taymiyya’s externalism is grounded on the purity of the fitra and his epistemic and methodological priority is always given to it and therefore is a broad and moderate version of foundationalism instead of being purely foundationalist. Classical foundationalism is based on the foundation of self-evident truths that do not require further justification or validation from other beliefs. As Ibn Taymiyya states,

“The proof which leads to knowledge through discursive reasoning (bi’lnaẓar) must be one that goes back to premises known necessarily from the fiṭra (muqaddimāt ḍarūrīyya fiṭrīyya). For all knowledge that is not known necessarily (ḍarūrī) must go (back) to necessary knowledge (ḍarūrī). For if rationally inferred premises are always established by other rationally inferred premises, it will lead to circularity or an infinite regress. (Ibn Taymiyya, Dar’ ta‘āruḍ al-‘aql wa-l-naql, 3:309)

There must be an intuitive primordial knowledge which God initiates in a person’s heart/mind and the aim of all proofs is to go back to it and therefore it is necessary not inferential but foundational. There is also knowledge based on mass report of testimony. For Ibn Taymiyya, the fitra is that disposition created by God which guides human cognition to form certain types of beliefs in the appropriate circumstances, steering it to the acceptance of principles that are natural for humans to accept.

“In taking fiṭra to be the ultimate ground of the warrant of one’s beliefs, the Taymiyyan scheme allows for a more moderate and broader version of foundationalism, perhaps similar to the sort we see defended by Reid and Plantinga. On the Taymiyyan scheme, a number of beliefs can be foundational whether the belief in question be “sensory (ḥiṣṣīyya), experiential (mujarraba), demonstrative (burhaˉnīyya), or by mass transmission (mutawaˉtira ̣)” (Ibn Taymiyya 2005, 133). These beliefs can be, using Plantinga’s terminology, properly basic with respect to warrant because they are a natural output of fiṭra: a direct consequence of the human being’s cognitive disposition functioning as it has been designed to do so. This fiṭra-based foundationalism allows for broadness when predicated on fiṭra, as opposed to narrowly restricting foundational beliefs, and grounds them in a proper function-esque epistemology. Further, this foundationalism is moderate in that it allows for potentially fallible belief sources to nevertheless produce foundational knowledge. Ibn Taymiyya admits that our sensory faculties (al-ḥiss al-baˉṭin aw al-ẓaˉhir) and intellect (‘aql) may succumb to error (ghalaṭ), but are nonetheless in essence sound (ṣaḥḥa). This he states is because “God created His servants upon fiṭra” (Ibn Taymiyya 2014, 45). In other words, when unimpaired, fiṭra will generally guide our cognition to truth even if it may at times be distorted. Moreover, these matters of distortion are something identifiable and known. Hence one can distinguish between those beliefs that are the products of sound cognition and those which are not…Hence, the moderate nature of a fiṭra-based foundationalism.” (Turner JB, 2023, pp 9-10)

God’s Acts:

Ibn Taymiyyah’s sophisticated philosophy agrees with al-Ghazali and the Kalam scholars that created objects are not eternal and that they come into existence after a period of non-existence. Only God is eternal and uncreated which led to Ibn Taymiyyah to reject Avicenna’s Neoplatonic concept of eternal emanation. There is no sequence of eternal intellects and souls flowing from God to the realm of generation and decay beneath the moon. Everything apart from God comes into existence after it did not exist.

However, Ibn Taymiyyah agrees with the philosophers that God’s perfection necessitates continuous creation from eternity. He argues against the Kalam tradition that God could not have begun creating at some arbitrary point in the past without a preceding cause. Ibn Taymiyyah argues God changing from not creating to creating introduces imperfection into God. Therefore, perfect God will always be creating,

“As [God] is Creator of everything, everything other than Him is created and preceded by nonexistence. So, with Him there is nothing eternal by virtue of His eternity. When it is said that He has been creating from eternity, its meaning is that He has been creating one created thing after another from eternity just as He will be creating one created thing after another to eternity. That which we deny [i.e. eternity], we deny of originating events and movements, one after another. There is nothing in this except an ascription to Him of perpetuity of acting, not [an ascription] of one among the things [He has] done being with Him [eternally] in its concrete entity.” (Majmu Al-Fatawa 18:239)

However, Ibn Taymiyyah differentiates between God’s continuous creativity and the temporal existence of individual created things. While God’s creative activity is eternal, no single created thing is eternal. This allows him to uphold the view of God’s eternal creativity without asserting the eternity of the world. Nothing that God creates is eternal alongside Him as everything comes into existence after not existing. The genus or species of created things is eternal, while no actual individual created thing is eternal.

While the other Islamic philosophers believed in God being completely timeless, Ibn Taymiyyah also diverts from this as he argued that there are temporally originating events existing within God’s essence which are known as God’s voluntary acts or attributes. However, this does not make God temporally originated. God acts in temporal succession as well but this does not mean that God enters into His creation. He finds it illogical for a timelessly eternal will to generate something in the world at a specific point in time. Therefore,

“[God] has been active from eternity when He willed with acts that subsist in His self by His power and His will one after another…He has been speaking from eternity by His will, and He has been acting from eternity by His will one thing after another.” (Minhaj as-Sunnah an-Nabawiyyah 1:147)

While many Muslim philosophers and theologians affiliated with the Hanbali school of thought or Athari creed hold great respect for Ibn Taymiyyah and align with a significant portion of his theological ideas, not everyone agrees with his doctrine of perpetual creation.

God’s Attributes:

The correct doctrine ascribes to God everything that He has ascribed to Himself. One must acknowledge it both verbally and in their hearts. When it is said that God has a face that does not mean it is a body part or it is made of flesh. There must be a belief in it without comparing it to any created entity for God is above being like unto creatures. The apparent meaning and wording of His attributes are known analogically but the modality or reality of the attributes are known to God alone and therefore must not be questioned. God is likewise above those who deny his attributes or to make them metaphors such as when God’s hands are mistakenly attributed to mean His power. This is to deny His attribute of possessing hands. God’s hand is responsible for directly creating Adam. Furthermore, God’s attributes are inseparable from His essence and yet not identical to each other and this distinction does not entail composition or causation but rather it is a counterfactual dependence. His attributes are not divided by time or space and therefore are distinguished by identity. The attributes of God are real and are affirmed in the texts based on the understanding of the pious predecessors and this is the apparent meaning which takes the entire corpus of revelation into context. All His attributes are uncreated The correct doctrine likewise holds that God is capable of acting in succession and can create different things at different times (55:29). Likewise, He can speak to His creation by His will and power whenever He wills. He can go from speaking with Moses to not speaking with him. All His actions are uncreated including those that have a beginning in time. God does not gain particular attributes while acting successively. The Creator in all of His Majesty possesses these attributes eternally, but individual speech acts occur in time. God’s action is His attribute and that which is acted upon is distinct from Him as it is part of His creation. God's acts are distinct from the effects of His acts. The created effect is the result of the uncreated act. Furthermore, when the meaning is known of the attributes of God this is not anthropomorphizing God as the ontology is different. God and creation can possess an essence without being similar ontologically due to analogical predication. Furthermore, when it is said that God exists and His creation exists, the sharing of the universal of “existing” is again not anthropomorphizing unless there is an assumed realism. The assumed realism states that God and His creation both have, for example, knowledge and this universal of knowledge must be partially identical in God and man. However, if realism is rejected in favor of nominalism/conceptualism the objection falls as there is no ontological sharing as ontological sharing does not exist. Every object including its essence and attributes is particular and not universal as universals only exist as concepts in the mind. We experience God directly with our eyes through the beatific vision in the afterlife and we experience Him in this world through our fitra which is not through an inferential process nor argumentation but an inferential or empirical process and argumentation can be used to know God. The principles of reasonings are known directly through the fitra as an apparatus. For example, all humans know that a half is less than a whole and this is direct knowledge without requiring inference. It relies on the existence of God to create us with the fitra and the fitra is also a natural disposition to recognize God. There is real causality in the world which does not operate without God’s will. There is secondary causality. God’s actions are His attributes rather than His actions refer only to His created effects. They have a beginning in time and yet are uncreated. The Quran is uncreated and my recitation is uncreated. The Quran is not eternal in terms of speech-act as it was spoken in time to the angel Gabriel then to the Prophet Muhammad ﷺ. It is eternal in the sense that it is within God’s knowledge that He knew that He would speak but that act of speaking itself happens at a particular moment in time.

Occasionalism is an incorrect position. The existence of secondary causality in the world indicates that events can have causes other than direct intervention by God. Occasionalism, on the other hand, posits that all events are directly caused by God without any intermediary causes. Overall, unlike the God of the Aristotelians, the God of Islam is a dynamic creator who knows particulars and is not simple, acts in succession, and has multiple real attributes without being a composite being.

God’s act is an attribute of the one that is acting, it subsists in His essence and therefore the effect of the act is distinct from the action as the effect is creation itself. Nothing that is created can subsist in His essence because God is uncreated. The description of an attribute is also distinct from the thing that it is being attributed to. When I call God beautiful, the speech of me calling God beautiful is a description of God and the attribute that I am referring to subsists in His essence. This also goes for the speech of God. Everything apart from God is created and all His attributes subsist in Him and God is greater than all. His act of speaking is tied to His will and His power as God chooses to speak by His will. It is important to mention that the way God hears is unlike the way we hear things but the plain meaning is affirmed. It is analogically predicated of God.

Does Allah, or God act in succession, or does He do one thing and then do another? Yes, He can go from speaking to Moses to not speaking to him – volitional acts. His actions also subsist in His essence. Therefore, there are new occurrences that happen within the essence of God. However, is it the case that everything that is recent is created and therefore if it is in the essence of God then God is created? No, temporality does not mean created. An action of God is an attribute of Him as previously established. The one upon whom the action is done is other than God, or created. His occurrences are not similar to those of creation. When it is said that I stood up, it is not said that I created my standing and the act of me standing is not separate from me either. God always has His attributes and there are temporal actions in the essence of God. There must be voluntary acts in God’s essence for change to arise in the world. To deny acts subsisting in God is to deny that He is acting and originating. Activity would necessarily mean change in the condition of the agent if he had to conform to the matter he is creating or reforming, or to exert effort to execute his volitions, such that his acts are the expression of demands made upon him by conditions external to himself. If God, however, has infinite power, then His voluntary action is simply pure self-expression that is concerned with nothing foreign or external to the self; it neither adds something not of the self to the self, nor makes something of the self into that which is not of the self. Change of the essence and essential attributes is not conceivable of the Eternal, but this does not preclude Him from engaging His creation temporally and effecting His eternal power in successive acts of creation, provision, giving life and death.

God and Space:

According to Jon Hoover’s interpretation of Ibn Taymiyya, there is no direction, space, or existent thing above creation except God and thus He does not direct Himself toward or away from anything else above. There is no existent space above creation outside God that God could be said to occupy. Space does not exist separately from spatially extended objects. Space refers to the boundaries and sides of an object inside of which the object is found and which cannot exist independently of the object itself. Without the object, there is no space. Spatially extended objects do not need the space they occupy, rather special extension subsists in the object and depends upon the object. Space is not a thing in itself but the space that God is in subsists in His essence. It is not illogical for Allah to be above His Throne but it is illogical for God to enter His creation. In other words, God is beyond the created world and there is nothing above creation except for Him. God’s relationship with what is above creation is not directional in the way we understand physical direction. There is no existence of any space outside of God above creation. The space in which God is present is not an independent entity but is part of God’s essence.

It is proven in the Quran and Sunnah and by the consensus of the Salaf that Allah is above His Heavens over His Throne as befits His Majesty. He is above all things, and there is nothing that is above Him. God says in the Quran:

“Allah, it is He Who has created the heavens and the earth, and all that is between them in six days. Then He rose over (istawa) the Throne (in a manner that suits His Majesty). You (mankind) have none, besides Him, as a Wali (protector or helper) or an intercessor. Will you not then remember (or receive admonition)?” (Q. 32:4)

“Surely, your Lord is Allah Who created the heavens and the earth in six days and then rose over (istawa) the Throne (in a manner that suits His Majesty), disposing the affair of all things.” (Q. 10:3)

“He is the First (nothing is before Him) and the Last (nothing is after Him), the Most High (nothing is above Him) and the Most Near (nothing is nearer than Him).” (Q. 57:3)

The Prophet ﷺ said: “You are the Most High and there is nothing above You…” Sunan Ibn Majah 3831

This is the view of Ahl al-Sunnah wa’l-Jama’ah who affirm that Allah is above His creation and that He is also with the believers as the text must be read in its plain meaning while still denying the likeness to creatures. Most of the exegetists said that what is meant is that He is near by means of His angels whose task it is to record people’s deeds. Furthermore, those who said that it means that He is near explained it as meaning that He is nearby through His knowledge and His love of us and not physical closeness. It is not that God is ontologically everywhere or that He is confined to one place. Nor is it the case that Allah being above His Throne is metaphorical or non-literal that He is above it in power or ownership even though God does own it as with everything else as a non-literalist reading strips God of His attribute of ascending over the Throne. One needs to understand the ascending over the Throne in the proper context without likening God to His creation. The meaning is clear but the modality or “how-ness” is known only to Allah. God ascending or descending does not necessarily entail that He enters creation or is in creation or is confined to a physical place. There was a time before creation where Allah was alone and when He created creation the Throne is the highest part of it. God is not in a place because there is no universe or place after the Throne, Allah having ascended over it.

Overall ,

“Ibn Taymiyya deems it a necessary truth of reason and the natural constitution (fiṭra) that God is located above and distinct from the universe in a spatial sense. God is above the sky and not found anywhere within the created world. Ibn Taymiyya also regards this as the plain witness of revelation, as in the Qur’anic verses, “They fear their Lord above them” (Q. 16:50), and “The All-Merciful sat over the Throne” (Q. 20:5)… bn Taymiyya denies the existence of space that subsists independently of other existents. He takes inspiration from Ibn Rushd who denies the existence of void space and defines place (makān) in Aristotelian terms as the inner surface of the body surrounding and containing it. The place of one celestial sphere, for example, is the inner surface of the celestial sphere surrounding it, but the universe has no place because it is not surrounded by anything at all, not even void space. Ibn Taymiyya likewise affirms that there is no void space. Space (ḥayyiz) is the boundary of an object inside of which the object extends and obtains. The boundaries are part of the object and do not exist apart from it. Without the object, no space exists. To put it differently, existents do not occupy space; instead, existents are spatially extended (mutaḥayyiz). So, nothing exists except God and the world below. There is nothing above the world except God, and there is no space above God that God could be said to occupy… Ibn Taymiyya’s views on God and space, God is a huge indivisible, spatially extended existent that surrounds the entire universe. God is not an existent in space, nor does God transcend space. Rather, God is spatial in God’s essence. There is no void space, and no space exists apart from God and the universe that God has created.” (Hoover, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Views on Causality:

Ibn Taymiyya rejects the Asharite claim of occasionalism and therefore claims that all created things are subject to causality. However, an effect does not rely on one cause rather a confluence of other causes and obstacles that need to be absent for the effect to occur. Therefore, for Allah (God in Arabic) to create an effect, He completes the causes and removes the obstacles and these causes and obstacles are part of the Divine Decree. If an effect does not occur then the causes are not completed and the obstacles are not removed. Furthermore, there is no being that is created that can be an efficient cause since it is created. Rather, Allah is the only efficient cause and Allah is the one who makes causes effective. Therefore, one should not solely rely on causes but on Allah who is the creator of causes. Furthermore, an individual must fulfill these causes. Without the causes and the removal of obstacles, there will not be any effect and Allah is the creator who empowers these causes in accordance with His wisdom and justice which is for the love and benefit of humanity. Created things cause effects as well that are created by Allah and this is known through our experience of the world. Human beings have free will who have power to act causally but Allah is the creator of their actions. He creates an effect through as many causes as He wills until the matter returns to the first cause which is His Will but the term first cause will be quantified later. The will attached to creatures is originated as creatures are originated. Since everything besides Allah is originated, He has a successive and dynamic will that always existed as His attribute. For change to occur in this world, Ibn Taymiyya also claimed that there must be voluntary acts in Allah’s essence and these acts are uncreated as there are no created things that subsist in His essence but their effects are created as Allah can go from speaking to Moses and to not speaking to Moses. As there are no created things that subsist in His essence, Allah’s successive willings do not entail change in His essence.

Whatever Allah wills exists and whatever He does not will does not exist. Human actions are ontologically decreed by Allah and created by Him, He has rendered our performance, as humans also possess power and will to carry out deed, of what He commanded to be the causes of salvation and He is never unjust. For the final cause of an effect to occur God must allow it as one cause is not independently sufficient rather other causes assist and obstacles need to be removed and as stated, God must allow it to be an efficient cause. Therefore, relying on causes alone is a form of polytheism while rejecting causes altogether is the denial of the Divine Decree and pure reason. Individuals can be part of one of the many causes that lead to an effect. Perhaps, therefore, whatever effects occur as a result of an individual’s good actions (including good intent) will be recorded as a good deed because their actions were causes leading to the effect. Ultimately, one good’s deeds will not bring them into paradise but only the grace of Allah’s mercy will and He knew all the deeds you would perform before it came into existence.

“One’s good deeds will not make him enter Paradise.’ They [the Companions] asked, ‘Even you, O Allah’s Messenger?’ He replied, ‘Even I, until and unless Allah bestows His grace and mercy on me.”

Furthermore, it can be interpreted that people who are destined for hell and for paradise are created to perform acts concordant to their destination.

“We were in a funeral in the graveyard of Gharqad when Allah’s Messenger ﷺ came to us and we sat around him. He had a stick with him. He lowered his head and began to scratch the earth with his stick, and then said: There is not one amongst you whom a seat in Paradise or Hell has not been allotted and about whom it has not been written down whether he would be an evil person or a blessed person. A person said: Allah's Messenger, should we not then depend upon our destiny and abandon our deeds? Thereupon he said: Acts of everyone will be facilitated in that which has been created for him so that whoever belongs to the company of the blessed will have good works made easier for him and whoever belongs to the unfortunate ones will have evil acts made easier for him. He then recited this verse (from the Qur'an): “Then, who gives to the needy and guards against evil and accepts the excellent (the truth of Islam and the path of righteousness it prescribes), We shall make easy for him the easy end and who is miserly and considers himself above need, We shall make easy for him the difficult end” (xcii. 5-10).”

All individuals must not rely on their destiny and act. Allah knows all matters and determined their causes and allowed their effect. Just because He knows what one will perform before they act, He does not punish an individual solely due to His foreknowledge. Rather an individual is punished or rewarded after they act.

It is clear that Ibn Taymiyya affirms secondary causation and no secondary cause can act alone. Human acts can be caused by God’s act of creating directly and He is the creator of human acts. Human acts originate after not existing. Since it is an originating event then there must be an originator. That originator must be either Allah or the human. If it is the human then the act’s originator requires a prior originator and that will lead to an infinite regress which is impossible to all sound minds. Therefore, the originator of human acts and will is God alone. The origination of human acts does not rely on the individual themselves for the creation of the act.

“The shaykh follows al-Razi in insisting on God’s preponderance of the human act, and he maintains the compatibility of this with human accountability by a libertarian account of human agency with the simple existence of a human agency willed and created by God. Ibn Taymiyya maintains that human beings have acts that exist in reality just as they have essences and attributes that are real, but, if human beings may be said to have choice and freedom in the shaykh’s thought, it is strictly in a compatibilist sense.” (Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism pg. 154)

Then can it be said that Allah creates evil when the individual acts sinful? This cannot be the case as Ibn Taymiyya distinguishes between God who is the creator of the act and the human agent by attributing the act solely to the substrate in which the act subsists i.e. the individual. For example, if Allah created a brown rock, this does not mean that God Himself is brown or a rock. Therefore, God cannot be called to account for creating bad acts as He created them in a substrate other than himself. The human act is the act of the human and created by God but the act of the human is not committed by God. Allah is never unjust to his creation and everything He creates is for a wise purpose.

On Universals and Particulars:

For Ibn Taymiyya there was a distinction between external existence and mental existence. Furthermore, according to him, it is a matter of necessary knowledge that all existents fall into either one of two categories: existing in the external world or only in the mind. He believed that universals or abstract concepts only existed in the mind while particulars existed in the external world. This is contrary to the philosophers who claimed that universals existed outside the mind either existing ontologically independent of the particular as with Plato and his perfect forms or inside the particular as with Aristotle. It is the sharing of the universals that particulars can be part of the same species. Yet, despite the sharing of the universal, each particular is distinct from the other. Therefore, there are elements in which they share the universal while having elements that cause them to differ which are distinct from their universal essence and are unique to each particular. For example, there can be a white horse and a black horse. They share the universal of “horse-ness” including essential attributes like having four legs, a mane, and a tail. They share the universal of having color even though they are distinct horses. They also share the universal of existence. This sharing of universals is an ontological aspect rather than a logical one.

In Islamic philosophy, to avoid anthropomorphism, there was a denial any positive attributes of God as any ontological sharing of attributes would suggest similarities between the particulars that are sharing the universals. Ibn Taymiyya rejects this reasoning as he claims that universals exist only in the mind logically rather than ontologically.

According to Ibn Taymiyya, particular things are not constituted by anything absolute; they are defined only by their specific qualities, which are unique to them and not shared by any other. The only form of “sharing” that occurs is the common classification of these entities under universal concepts within the mind. However, these universal concepts are purely mental and possess only logical existence within the mind and serve as classifications in human cognition. In other words, while there might be similarity among externally existing particulars, it is only a mental judgment after abstracting their qualities for classification.

View On Syllogisms:

Before we discuss Ibn Taymiyya’s critique of syllogisms, the background knowledge of Ibn Sina and Aristotelian epistemology needs to be established. Like the Thomists, Ibn Sina was a foundationalist. Foundationalism builds new knowledge on a base of primary knowledge. Without this base, reasoning would lead to an infinite regress (constantly needing to justify each step with another, prior step). Furthermore, Ibn Sina divided knowledge into conceptualization and assent with the former being concepts of the mind such as primary and acquired concepts. Primary concepts are known immediately without the need for reasoning. Examples include fundamental notions like “thing” and “existent”. Acquired concepts, on the other hand, are obtained by forming real definitions. These definitions specify the essence of a species by indicating its genus and specific difference. For example, the concept of “human” is defined as “rational animal” derived by understanding “animal” as the genus and “rational” as the specific difference. Assent is what affirms the validity of any proposition which can be divided into primary and acquired assent. Primary assent can either be certain or probable with the former being self-evident truths such as the whole being greater than the part, direct sense perception such as with the senses which include both the inner and outer senses (outer is the five senses with inner being hunger, thirst, joy, pain, the existence of one’s own soul, and the existence of God), and widely transmitted reports. Probable primary assent refers to customs and laws. Acquired assents, on the other hand, are like induction or analogy which are both probable and syllogisms which are certain.

As for his critique of Ibn Sina, he rejected the idea that definitions can tell you the true essence of a thing and also rejects that the attributes of extramental realities are not divided into those which are quiddative or essential and those which are not. Rather, he claimed that definitions are based on linguistics rather than revealing real essences. Furthermore, real definitions cannot lead to the acquisition of conceptualizations at all. Rather, conceptualizations are empirical as they arise a posteriori. As for definitions such as “rational animal” for humans, real definitions do not impart new knowledge. For someone to understand a definition, they must already be familiar with the terms used in the definition. The definition of “human” as a “rational animal” is merely an assertion. A person who understands this definition does so based on prior knowledge, not because the definition itself provided new information. For someone unfamiliar with the concept hearing the definition alone is insufficient; they need further validation to accept it.

As for the syllogism, he deemed it to be unnecessary. As for syllogisms themselves, he argued that they do not need to be composed of a minimum of two premises. He argued that, depending on the person seeking knowledge, sometimes only one premise is needed to make an inference of its necessary entailment. For example,

“Ibn Taymiyya notes that every created thing known with certainty to exist entails the existence of the Creator necessarily. The argument does not need to be reformulated into a categorical syllogism to provide certainty, and to require the syllogistic form is mere pedantry.” (Hoover, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

Furthermore, as a conceptualist, he claimed that all of the physical world’s knowledge is rooted in particulars. Therefore, as an empiricist (not in all cases he can be described as such as he believed that the existence of God can be argued rationally), he claimed that syllogisms using universal principles to describe the particulars of the world can never be certain but only probabilistic. For example, to determine whether the universal, “All flames burn”, is true one would need to examine all flames to see whether they all burn. If someone did examine every flame then there would be no point in constructing a syllogism. Revelation can impart true knowledge universally of particulars.

Another argument he makes against syllogisms is that analogy and syllogism are the same thing or lead to the same knowledge. While Aristotelian logic claimed that that analogy can never be certain as it only compares two particulars based on a shared characteristic and the cause of the shared characteristic cannot be known with certainty, Ibn Taymiyya claimed that the middle term in a syllogism is identical to an analogy and is identical to the first figure in a syllogism after being reformulated. For example,

“He illustrates with the famous juristic case of date wine (nabīdh). Date wine is forbidden by analogy to grape wine because both intoxicate. Intoxication is the cause of forbiddance in both the original and the assimilated cases. Likewise, date wine is forbidden by the following demonstration: every date wine is an intoxicant; every intoxicant is forbidden; therefore, date wine is forbidden. Ibn Taymiyya acknowledges that the greatest question concerning analogy is how to ascertain that the characteristic shared by the original and assimilated cases (e.g., intoxication) causes or necessitates the ruling (e.g., forbiddance). However, he explains, that is no different from the equally difficult problem of identifying the middle term in a categorical syllogism. If the middle term is certainly the cause and the premises are certain, that forms a demonstration. Otherwise, the major premise in the syllogism will be only probable, and the conclusion will likewise be only probable. As noted above, Ibn Taymiyya maintains that it is not possible to acquire certain knowledge of universal propositions in extramental reality (e.g., that all flames burn), and so he effectively reduces the categorical syllogism to the epistemic level of analogy as a tool for acquiring new knowledge of the world outside the mind.” (Hoover, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)

In other words, date wine is forbidden by analogy to grape wine because both intoxicate and thus intoxication is the cause for it being haram. This analogy can be formulated into a syllogism

P1: Every date wine is an intoxicant.

P2: Every intoxicant is forbidden.

C1: Therefore, every date wine is forbidden.

In other words, he acknowledges the difficulty in analogies in identifying that the shared characteristic being the cause or the middle term in the syllogism but argues that syllogisms have the same problem. If the syllogism’s middle term is probable then the conclusion is probable. The middle term being a universal is difficult as discussed earlier with the flame example. Universals are understood through examining particular cases. Furthermore, if the necessitating cause in the analogy is universal then the original case used in the analogy is no longer needed for future rulings as the ruling will apply universally wherever the cause, intoxication in the case of wine, is present. Revelation plays a big role in establishing universal principles. Therefore, divine revelation can provide certain knowledge about the particulars which empirical observation alone cannot achieve. He is not against categorical syllogisms as a whole but does not deem them the only way to certainty about the world.

Views On Ethics:

Utilitarianism as propagated by Jeremy Bentham states that an act is good when it produces the maximum happiness and benefit for the greatest number. Then religious utilitarianism would be maximizing happiness and benefit for this world and for the hereafter. For Ibn Taymiyya, worship of God alone is the ultimate purpose of humanity and leads to the ultimate happiness and benefit of humans. Therefore, Ibn Taymiyya thought in terms of religious utilitarianism. He applied this framework to understand God’s actions as well. Furthermore, in his ethics,

“The Book and justice are inseparable. The Book explicates the law. The law is justice, and justice is the law. Anyone who judges with justice judges with the law… The entire revealed law is justice’ (MF 35:366).

Law and human benefit are equivalent such that there is no benefit outside of the law as benefit is the law and law is benefit.

“The principle overall is that the law never neglects a benefit. Indeed, God – Exalted is He – has perfected the religion for us and completed the blessing. The Prophet – May God bless him and give him peace – has indeed spoken about everything that will bring us closer to the Garden” (MF 11:344).

Ibn Taymiyya also believes that morality is an objective feature of the world and we as humans are guided by the fitra or a natural disposition created by God that guides us towards these morals just as we naturally know that food satiates hunger. Furthermore, every act of God is based on justice and a wise purpose and this purpose is for human welfare thus the consequence and result of actions define the ethical value of actions more than the actions themselves.

What should be done according to Ibn Taymiyya if following the law perfectly and attaining full benefit is not possible?

“One has to investigate. If the right is greater, it is commanded, even if it necessarily entails something wrong of lesser import. Wrong is not prohibited if [prohibiting it] necessarily entails losing something right greater than it. Indeed, prohibiting in that case would be tantamount to blocking the way of God…If the wrong is predominant, then it is prohibited, even if this involves losing something right less than it. Commanding that [lesser] right that involves a greater wrong is commanding wrong and furthering disobedience to God and His Messenger. If right and wrong are intertwined and equally in balance, then they are neither commanded nor prohibited. Sometimes it is beneficial to command, and sometimes it is beneficial to prohibit…It all depends on the specific and actual circumstances” (MF 28:129-130).

The example Ibn Taymiyya uses for this is if a king becomes a Muslim but if prohibiting the king from drinking alcohol would lead to him apostatizing then it would be better to allow him to drink to prevent the greater harm. It should be noted that one should have the proper intention as well for their deeds to be accepted as good.

A trilemma was presented to Ibn Taymiyya regarding God’s wisdom.

“Concerning the goodness of the will of God…Does He create for a cause or for other than a cause?

1. If it is said, ‘not for a cause,’ He is aimless – Exalted is God above that.

2. If it is said, ‘For a cause,’ and if you say that it is eternal, it necessarily follows that the effect is eternal.

3. And if you say that it is temporally originated, it follows necessarily that it had a cause, but an endless chain is absurd” (MF 8:81)

The first claim is of the Asharites who believed that God acts without a purpose, the second claim is of the philosophers such as Ibn Sina who believed that the world is eternal alongside God, and the third is of the Mu'tazilis who believed that there are temporally originating events in God’s essence (in a sense). The Asharites claimed that if God acted for a wise purpose then there would be an infinite regress and if there were temporally originating events in God’s essence then that would imply that God changes. They also claimed that if God acted for a wise purpose then this implies that God was imperfect but then perfected when achieving His goal. The Mut’tazilis claimed that God acts for wise purposes that are disjoined from His essence so the wise purposes impact humanity but do not impact God. However, the Asharites rebut that even if the purposes are not connected to God then there is still temporality and God is perfected by His wise purposes (refer to the extra notes at the end (and the blog post after this for much more detail)). The Greek inspired Islamic philosophers claimed that God is timelessly eternal and is pure act such that God emanates the world through a series of emanations as an eternal effect. God’s will is identical to His knowledge therefore God does not act for purposes and therefore is perfect eternally.

Ibn Taymiyya, as per the Athari tradition, refutes all three by claiming, against the Asharites, that a God who does not create for a wise purpose is foolish and a God that acts by His power is better than a God with no power and an eternal will does not create temporal effects. Ibn Taymiyya also rejects Ibn Sina and the Neoplatonic scheme of emanations. Against the Mu’tazilis, Ibn Taymiyya claimed that disjoined wise purposes are not God’s anymore and God acts not indifferently to creatures but for them according to His love and His own benefit. Therefore, God, according to Ibn Taymiyya, is perfect and acts and creates by His will and power for a wise purpose and has causes that subsist in His essence as temporal events that regress infinitely into the past for His own benefit. God is not subject to time but time arises out of God’s dynamic activity. Furthermore, he claimed that God has been active from eternity and acts in temporal sequence. These temporal events originating in God’s essence do not create a change in God because they are voluntary attributes and acts so God does not change and God is consistent in His character. As for the Asharite claim that God acting for a wise purpose entails that God was previously imperfect, Ibn Taymiyya claimed that it is rational to be perfected by one’s acts. A God who cannot act for a wise purpose is imperfect and what God creates is the best possibility. God is perfected through His own acts just as He is perfected through His attributes and essence. God does not need His creation to be self-sufficient rather we rely on God for everything.

Meta-Ethical Views:

Basic religious and ethical truths are also known by reason. This includes the fact that the God is the only being worthy of worship. Mankind also knows what is good and what is bad as they can be reduced between suitability and pleasure and the reverse. It is not solely on God’s will which is only through revelation which is the position of the Asharis.

Reason’s Relationship with Revelation:

According to Hoover in his work, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism,

“…the shaykh sets forth simple and direct cosmological arguments for God’s existence. The existence of the Creator is known necessarily by reason from the fact of created existence. It is commonsense that everything needs a cause and that all things must have an originator that is ultimately eternal and self-sufficient: “The originated being itself knows through clear reason that it has an originator.” Every creature is by its very existence a sign necessarily entailing the essence, unity and attributes of the Creator, and it is the way of the prophets to point to God by mentioning these signs.49 The existence of the Self-Sufficient and the Eternal Existent which is Necessary in Itself is known by “the necessity of reason (#darūrat al-≠aql)” and from the need of every originated event for an originator (mu!hdith), as well as from the need of something possible (mumkin) for something else to give it existence (mūjid).” (Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism pg 33)

For something to come into existence or for new events to occur, such as something as simple as a baby being born, is a rational proof of God existing. We know we did not create ourselves and this points to a creator that is an uncaused-cause, eternal, and self-sufficient otherwise it would fall into an infinite regress. Furthermore, if there is something contingent then by necessity there must be something necessary. Ibn Taymiyya also accepted proofs of God from the philosophers as long as these proofs did not contradict the plain meaning of the Quran. The philosophers used indirect cosmological arguments to prove God. Ibn Taymiyya believed that the fitra and the arguments that the Quran uses are straightforward and direct such that even an old grandmother who lives on a farm could understand. However, for those whose fitra is corrupted, those longwinded syllogistic arguments for God can be used.

“Rather, according to Ibn Taymiyya, God’s origination of the human being after it was nonexistent is known directly by all through reason apart from prophetic revelation even though the prophets and the Quran also use this form of proof.” (Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism pg 34)

Contrary to popular opinion, Ibn Taymiyya was not against logic but argued that true reason and true revelation can never contradict. Anyone who knows the rational proofs understand the fact that they entail what the prophets brought.

Whatever contradicts the Quran and the Sunna lies outside the pale of rationality. Thus, the proofs of reason, rightly exercised, lead to the same end as do the proofs of tradition, and they derive from the same source. A passage from Ibn Taymiyya’s letter illustrates how revelation and reason may be conceived as complementary paths to the same truth. ‘[The Salaf and their followers] knew that both revelational and rational proofs were true and that they entailed one another. Whoever gave rational and certain proofs (al-adilla al-≠aqliyya al-yaqīniyya) the complete inquiry due them knew that they agreed with what the messengers informed about and that they proved to them the necessity of believing the messengers in what they informed about. Whoever gave revelational proofs (al-adilla al-sam≠iyya) the understanding due them knew that God guided His servants in His Book to certain rational proofs by which are known the existence of the Creator, the subsistence of His attributes of perfection and His exoneration from imperfections and from anything being like Him in the attributes of perfection, and which prove His uniqueness, the uniqueness of His lordship, the uniqueness of His divinity, His power, His knowledge, His wisdom, His mercy, the truthfulness of His messengers, the obligation to obey them in what they obligate and command, and believing them in what they teach and inform about.’” (Hoover, Ibn Taymiyya’s Theodicy of Perpetual Optimism pg 30-31)

Revelation reiterates the correct rational proofs pertinent to religion. As Ibn Taymiyya explains elsewhere, revelation contains both information and rational proofs. The rational proofs are both revelational by virtue of being brought by God and His messengers and rational since they are judged true by reason. Revelation embodies true rationality. Once one has access to revelation, one identifies it immediately as identical to whatever truth one knew previously through reason. Therefore, the truthfulness of the prophets can only be known through reason. Reason, however, cannot tell us everything such as theological matters such as how many times to pray or how to dress, therefore, revelation is necessary.

Furthermore, in Carl Sharif El-Tobgui’s book, Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation, he argued that Ibn Taymiyya claimed the real problem is not between reason and revelation but rather between knowledge and conjecture or what is conclusive versus what is speculative. Therefore, if revelation and logic are both conclusive and true, it is a logical impossibility for them to contradict.

“Ibn Taymiyya’s insistence that the relevant distinction to be made is between knowledge and conjecture rather than between reason (as a category) and revelation (as a category) has immediate implications for the epistemological status, as well as the religious-moral evaluation, of various arguments and proofs. In Argument 15, Ibn Taymiyya elaborates a fundamental distinction through which he seeks to shift the entire frame of reference in the debate concerning reason and revelation. He proposes that the real issue is not a question of “scriptural” versus “rational” (that is, sharʿī as opposed to ʿaqlī) proofs and methods, as scholars had framed the debate up until his time.” (El-Tobugi, Ibn Taymiyya on Reason and Revelation, pg 163-164)

Furthermore, Hatem al-Haj, in his book, Between the God of the Prophets and the God of the Philosophers: Reflections of an Athari on the Divine Attributes, states,

“Ibn Taymiyya did not attempt to belittle the office of reason or deny its importance in grounding our faith in revelation. He argued that reason is not one undifferentiated category of conclusive rational output. He argued that most rational propositions are speculative and they naturally should not be given precedence over the conclusive assertions of revelation. The same applies to revelation though so it would be natural that we give precedence to what is conclusive regardless whether it is rational or scriptural. When they are both speculative, we look for more probative proofs. There is thus no simple binary of reason versus revelation.”

It was the philosophy of the Islamic and Greek philosophers whose logic was speculative rather than conclusive. He maintained that sense perception and a priori reason can never be ignored in favor of revelation but they also can never be ignored since they never contradict revelation as it is an impossibility.

Extra notes since a peer review was posted on Jon Hoover’s Encyclopedia article on Ibn Taymiyya:

1. He can be described as a property dualist rather than a physicalist. A physicalist believes only physical entities exist. Ibn Taymiyya, however, believes that some things cannot be reduced to purely physical entities such as universals, which only exist in the mind. This also applies to logical axioms such as the law on non-contradiction, he describes them as mental entities only. Therefore, Hoover is incorrect to label him as a physicalist as physicalism cannot be consistent with property dualism. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy defines property dualism as the following,

“Property dualism says that (a) every particular is a physical particular but (b) some particulars (e.g. human beings) have psychological properties wholly distinct from any physical properties. The contrast here is with substance dualism. The substance dualist agrees with the property dualist that some particulars have psychological properties wholly distinct from any physical properties, but they will add that such particulars are themselves non-physical.”

2. When Hoover claims that Ibn Taymiyya’s rebuttal to the Asharis is that Allah is perfected by His wise purposes. This needs to be nuanced, Allah is not perfected – in the past tense – by his acts. It would be more accurate to state that Allah is eternally perfect and always perfect and never loses his perfection or gains perfection. However, any act that He performs at any given time is perfect in that moment and is not in need of anything and He acts for a wise purpose. Just as He is “perfected” by His attributes which He has eternally.

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The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya: A Comprehensive Overview of His Life and Systematic Theology

The Legacy of Ibn Taymiyya: A Comprehensive Overview of His Life and Systematic Theology

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